





Software Security Knowledge: Training



Robert A. Martin Sean Barnum

May 2011



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Report Documentation Page

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Agenda

8:00-8:45am Software Security Knowledge about

Applications Weaknesses

9:00-9:45am Software Security Knowledge about

Attack Patterns Against Applications

Training in Software Security

10:15-11:00am Software Security Practice

11:15-12:00am Supporting Capabilities


Assurance Cases

Secure Development & Secure

Operations




CWE is Meant for People to Use



A Human Capital Crisis in Cybersecurity

Technical Proficiency Matters

A White Paper of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency



16 July 2010

based on a body of knowledge that represents the complete set of concepts, terms and activities that make up a professional domain. And absent such a body of knowledge there is little basis for supporting a certification program. Indeed it would be dangerous and misleading.

A complete body of knowledge covering the entire field of software engineering may be years away. However, the body of knowledge needed by professionals to create software free of common and critical security flaws has been developed, vetted widely and kept up to date. That is the foundation for a certification program in software assurance that can gain wide adoption. It was created in late 2008 by a consortium of national experts, sponsored by DHS and NSA, and was updated in late 2009. It contains ranked lists of the most common errors, explanations of why the errors are dangerous, examples of those errors in multiple languages, and ways of eliminating those errors. It can be found at https://cwe.mitre.org/top25.

Any programmer who writes code without being aware of those problems and is not capable of writing code free of those errors is a threat to his or her employers and to others who use computers connected to systems running his or her software.

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Makir Security Measurab



The Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional (CSSLP) Certification Program will show software lifecycle stakeholders not only how to implement security, but how to glean security requirements, design, architect, test and deploy secure software.


An Overview of the Steps:

(ISC)2 S-day CSSLP CBK Education Program

Educate yourself and learn security best practices and industry standards for the software lifecycle through the CSSLP Education Program.(ISC)2 provides education your way to fit your life and schedule. Completing this course will, not only teach all of the











Common Security Errors in Programming

Special thanks to Robert A. Wartin of WITEE Corporation.

The SANS Common Security Errors in Programming may illustrates the sufficient versionesses that are respecialise for the majority of the guidady brown redocutolities absorression 2006. But haved unitin CNT Common Minakiness Enumeration; that provides a unified, measurable set of software residentials that will enable more effective discussive and action to find these weakereses in course only and eliminate them. The LNE was developed by INTHE and sponsored in the Department of Honorand Security. The number between parenthesis reprised the common enginees engageline for for each weakness Numbers between yourse backets are direct dolders of the residence listed. CVE IDs can be found a Be BITGE CVE Rid at e is accessed downly by putting the number in place of ATT in the following IRS http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/899.html





Handler Errors

User Interface Errors

UI Discrepancy for Security Feature

Multiple Interpretations of UI Input

UI Misrepresentation of Critical Infor

Behavioral Problems

Behavioral Change in New Version or Environment Expected Behavior Violation

Initialization and Cleanup Errors

Insecure Default Variable Initialization

External Initialization of Trusted Variables

Non-exit on Failed Initialization

Missing Initialization

Improper Cleanup on Thrown Ecception

Data Handling

Numeric Errors

Signed to Unsaywed Conversion from Unsigned to Signed Conversion Error

integer Overflow or Wespersund Integer UnderSow (Mrsp or Mrsparound)

resentation Errors

Chances Concentration and Competion from

Reliance on Data/Homory Layers

mation Management Errors

Privary Lask through Data Cueries

Distriction of Partie Williams

Creptionalist Coursely Interestina Lob

Information Look Through Instituting of Private Data Information Loss or Greateign

Improper Access of Indexable Resource ('Range Error')

improper Handling of Syntactically invalid Structure

Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)

Pathoams Traversal and Equivalence firms

Process Control

Maring CM, Validation

· Failure to Sanitize Data into a Different Plane [Imperior*)

is an SQL Command | SQL Injection | - (88) Fallies to Somes (Assimts LOAF Thereis Military and the State S

farmer to have been the Florence PCRF reprises Uncorrected Februar String Failure to Son time Special Elements in the a Deferment Place

Argument Naction or Madels above

Representation of Sexual Revents

Unchesked input for Long Condition

- And Byta Interaction Total Poince Stall Bytal

ESPIRET Misconfiguration, Not Using Imput Wilderson

· URL Redirection to Untrasted Site (*Open Redirect!) Manighia Fotoschum France

Unvalidated Function Work Asymmets

Improper Address Validation in IOCTL with METHOD NEITHER L'O Control Code

sized Buffer

Channel and Path Errors

Failure to Protect Alternate Path

Uncontrolled Search Path Element Unquoted Search Path or Element

Untrusted Search Path

Error Handling

Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes

Failure to Use a Standardized Error Handling Me

Failure to Catch All Exceptions in Servlet Not Failing Securely (Failing Open')

Missing Custom Error Page

Pointer Issues

Return of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range

Use of size of j on a Pointer Type

Incorrect Pointer Scaling

Use of Pointer Subtraction to Determine Size

Assignment of a Fixed Address to a Pointer

Attempt to Access Child of a Non-structure Po

Time and State

Mutable Chiects Passed by Reference Family Massic Chiecus to be Detroited Method

Temporary File Issues

Covert Timing Channel

Technology-Specific Time and State Issues

Symbolic Name not Mapping to Correct Object

Unrestricted Externally Accessible Lock

Double-Checked Locking

Insufficient Session Expiration

Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetim

Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere

Use of a Resource after Expiration or Release

External Influence of Sphere Definition

Redirect Without Exit

Failure to Fulfill API Contract ('API Abuse')

Failure to Clear Heap Memory Sefore Release (Heap Inspection)

Call to Non-abiquitous API

Use of Inherently Dangerous Function

Multiple Binds to the Same Port

DEF Bad Practices Direct Management of Connections

incorrect Check of Function Return Value

Often Misused: Arguments and Parameters Uncaught Exception

Often Misused String Management

JZEE Bad Practices: Direct Use of Sockets

Failure to Change Working Directory in chroot Jail

Reliance on DNS Lookups in a Security De

Failure to Follow Specification Failure to Provide Specified Functionality

Web Problems

failure to Sanitize CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ("HTTI Request Smaggling")

Use of Non-Cananical URL Paths for Authorization

Indicator of Poor Code Quality

Incorrect Black Delimitation

Omitted Break Statement in Switch

Use of Hard-coded, Security releasest Conc

Unsafe Function Call from a Signal Handle

Return of Stack Variable Address

Missing Detault Case in Switch Sta

Use of Obsolete functions Use of Function with Inconsistent imp

Unused Yanishie

Resource Management Errors

Explicit Call to Finalize() Reachable Assertion

Security Features

Credentials Management

Sweethed Password Change

Masing Password Field Macking Weak Cryptography for Passwords

Insufficiently Protected Condentials

Weak Password Recovery Medianism for Forgotten

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

+ Origin Validation Error

Password

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

The of Leur Trusted Source

Improperly Trusted Reserve DNS Insufficient Type Distinction

Failure to Add Integrity Check Value

Relance on File Name or Extension of Externally-Supplied File Belance on Obhazation or Encryption of Security-Relevant Inputs without integrity Checking

Privacy Violation

Impropedly Implemented Security Check for Standard

Improper futhentication

Logging of Excentine Data

Certificate Issues

- Clearnest Storage of Securitive Information Sensitive Conkiers HTTPS Session Without · Reservible One Was Hask · Inadequate Encryption Strength · Vie of RSA Algorithm without DAEP Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls - Permittion leases Improper Handling of Ireal fictors Permittion or Printinger.

Masing Required Cryptographic Step

Net Using a Random IV with CBC Made

· Fallan; to Encrypt Servitive Data

Password in Configuration File

Ballance on a Single Factor in a Security Deci

Belance on Security through Obsturity

Protection Mechanism Fallure

Imafficient Logging Ballance on Cookies without Validation and Integ Checking in a Security Decision

Insufficient Encapsulation

Mobile Code SussesWissing Custom Error Page The officer Class Containing Sentitive Data

Critical Public Variable Without Final Healthe

- finalize | Method Declared Public Leftover Debug Code

Use of Dynamic Class Loading

clone) Method Without super clone) Comparison of Classes by Name

Data Leak Between Sessions Trust Boundary Violation

Reliance on Package-level Scope

1355 Framework: Sawing Wroetaltrable Objects to Dest

Serializable Class Containing Sensitive Data

Information Leak through Class Clening Public Data Assigned to Private Amay-Taped Field

Private Array-Typed Field Returned From A Public

Public Static Final Field References Mutable Object Exposed Dangerous Method or Function

Critical Variable Declared Public Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Hethod



Manually review code after security education

Manual code review, especially review of high-risk code, such as code that faces the Internet or parses data from the Internet, is critical, but only if the people performing the code review know what to look for and how to fix any code vulnerabilities they find. The best way to help understand classes of security bugs and remedies is education, which should minimally include the following areas:

- C and C++ vulnerabilities and remedies, most notably buffer overruns and integer arithmetic issues.
- Web-specific vulnerabilities and remedies, such as cross-site scripting (XSS).
- · Database-specific vulnerabilities and remedies, such as SQL injection.
- · Common cryptographic errors and remedies.

Many vulnerabilities are programming language (C, C++ etc) or domain-specific (web, database) and others can be categorized by vulnerability type, such as injection (XSS and SQL Injection) or cryptographic (poor random number generation and weak secret storage) so specific training in these areas is advised.

Making Security Measurable¹

- . A Process for Performing Security Code Reviews, Michael Howard, IEEE Security & Privacy July/August 2006.
- . .NET Framework Security Code Review;
- . Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE; http://cwe.mitre.org/
- http://www.codesecurely.org/Wiki/view.aspx/Security_Code_Reviews
- Security Code Review Use Visual Studio Bookmarks To Capture Security Findings; http://blogs.msdn.com/alikl/archive/2008/01/24/security--visual-studio-bookmarks-to-capture-security-findings.aspx
- curity Code Review Guidelines, Adam Shostack; verber.com/mark/cs/security/code-review.html
- . OS VASP Top Ten; http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Top_Ten_Project



CWE CAPEC

Industry **Uptake**



Testing activities validate the secure implementation of a product, which red the likelihood of security bugs being released and discovered by customers a malicious users. The majority of SAFECode members have adopted the folk software security testing practices in their software development lifecycle. The is not to "test in security." but rather to validate the robustness and secur the software products prior to making the product available to customers. testing methods do find security bugs, especially for products that may not undergone critical secure development process changes.

Fuzz testing

Fuzz testing is a reliability and security testing technique that relies on but intentionally malformed data and then having the software under test consume the malformed data to see how it responds. The science of fuzz testing is somewhat new but it is maturing rapidly. There is a small market for fuzz testing tools today, but in many cases software developers must build bespoke fuzz testers to suit specialized file and network data formats. Fuzz testing is an effective testing technique because it uncovers weaknesses in data handling code.

- · Fuzz Testing of Application Reliability, University of Wisconsin; http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~bart/fuzz/fuzz.html
- · Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing, Michael Levin, Patrice Godefroid and Dave Molnar, Microsoft Research; ftp://ftp.research.microsoft.com/pub/tr/TR-2007-58.pdf
- . IANewsletter Spring 2007 "Look out! It's the fuzz!" Matt Warnock; http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/Vol10_No1.pdf
- · Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery. Sutton, Greene & Amini,
- . Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, MITRE: http://capec.mitre.org/



Fundamental Practices for Secure Software Development

A Guide to the Most Effective Secure Development Practices in Use Today


OCTOBER 8, 2008

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Steve Lipner, Microsoft Corp. Brad Minnis, Juniner Networks, Inc. Hardik Parekh, EMC Cornoration Dan Reddy, EMC Corporation Reeny Sondhi, EMC Corporation Antti Vähä-Sipilä, Nokia






a time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug that led to code calling into a freed memory block. The on Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classification for this vulnerability is CWE-367.


September 2008 (5) August 2008 (2) July 2008 (8) June 2008 (4) OCTOU issues. We will update our training to address this.

Our static analysis tools don't find this because the tools would need to understand the re-entrant nature of the code.

Fuzz Testing

OWASP Top Ten 2007 & 2010 use CWE refs









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Language

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Code Review Introduction

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Main

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- 1 Introduction
 - 1.1 Why Does Code Have Vulnerabilities?
- 1.2 What is Security Code Review?

Introduction

Code review is probably the single-most effective technique for identifying security flaws. When used together with automated tools and manual penetration testing, code review can significantly increase the cost effectiveness of an application security verification effort.

This guide does not prescribe a process for performing a security code review. Rather, this guide focuses on the mechanics of reviewing code for certain vulnerabilities, and provides limited guidance on how the effort should be structured and executed. OWASP intends to develop a more detailed process in a future version of this guide.

Manual security code review provides insight into the "real risk" associated with insecure code. This is the single most important value from a manual approach. A human reviewer can understand the context for certain coding practices, and make a serious risk estimate that accounts for both the likelihood of attack and the business impact of a breach.

Why Does Code Have Vulnerabilities?

MITRE has catalogued almost 700 different kinds of software weaknesses in their CWE project. These are all different ways that software developers can make mistakes that lead to insecurity. Every one of these weaknesses is subtle and many are seriously tricky. Software developers are not taught about these weaknesses in school and most do not receive any training on the job about these problems.

These problems have become so important in recent years because we continue to increase connectivity and to add technologies and protocols at a shocking rate. Our ability to invent technology has seriously outstripped our ability to secure it. Many of the technologies in use today simply have not received any security scrutiny.


There are many reasons why businesses are not spending the appropriate amount of time on security. Ultimately, these reasons stem from an underlying problem in the software market. Because software is essentially a black-box, it is extremely difficult to tell the difference between good code and insecure code. Without this visibility, buyers won't pay more for secure code, and vendors would be foolish to spend extra effort to produce secure code.

One goal for this project is to help software buyers gain visibility into the security of software and start to effect change in the software market.

Nevertheless, we still frequently get pushback when we advocate for security code review. Here are some of the (unjustified) excuses that we hear for not putting more effort into security:


"We never get hacked (that I know of), we don't need security"


Some High-Level CWEs Are Now Part of the NVD CVE Information



NVD XML feeds also include CWE

Vulnerability Type (View All)
SQL Injection (CWE-89)







known bugs and vulnerabilities. The dataset intends to encompass a wide variety of possible vulnerabilities, languages, platf compilers. The dataset is anticipated to become a large-scale effort, gathering test cases from many contributors. We have more in about the SRD, including goals, structure, test suite selection, etc.

Browse, download, and search the SRD

Anyone can browse or search test cases and download selected cases. Please click here to browse the test case repository; or selected or all test cases. To find specific test cases, please click here.

How to submit test cases

NIST Special Publications:

SP500-268 **CWF**

SP500-269 CWE

SP800-53a CVE, OVAL, CWE

CVE. CCE. CVSS. CWE SP800-115

NIST Interagency Reports:

NISTIR-7435 CVE, CVSS, CWE

NISTIR-7628 CVE, CWE

NIST Draft Special Publication 500-268

Source Code Security Analysis Tool Functional Specification Version 1.0

Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), Software Diagnostics and Conformance Testing Division

29 January, 2007

Michael Kass Michael Koo

National Institute of Standards and Technology Information Technology Laboratory Software Diagnostics and Conformance Testing Division



INL/EXT-10-18381

Idaho National Labs SCADA Report


NSTB Assessments Summary Report: Common Industrial Control System Cyber Security Weaknesses

May 2010





SECURE CONTROL SYSTEM/ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE






Table 27. Most common programming errors found in ICS code.

Weakness Classification	Vulnerability Type		
CWE-19: Data Handling	CWE-228: Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure		
	CWE-229: Improper Handling of Values		
	CWE-230: Improper Handling of Missing Values		
	CWE-20: Improper Input Validation		
	CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output		
	CWE-195: Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error		
	CWE-198: Use of Incorrect Byte Ordering		
CWE-119: Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a	CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ("Classic Buffer Overflow")		
Memory Buffer	CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow		
	CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow		
	CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read		
	CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index		
	CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size		
	CWE-170: Improper Null Termination		
	CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound		
	CWE-680: Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow		
CWE-398: Indicator of Poor Code	CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores		
Quality	CWE-456: Missing Initialization		
	CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable		
	CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference		
	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ("Resource Exhaustion")		
	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value		
	CWE-690: Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference		
	CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime		
CWE-442: Web Problems	CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Direct ("Path Traversal")		
	CWE-79: Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ("Cross-site Scripting")		
	CWE-89: Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure ("SQL Injection")		
CWE-703: Failure to Handle	CWE-431: Missing Handler		
Exceptional Conditions	CWE-248: Uncaught Exception		
	CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions		
	CWE-390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action		

6 - Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

7 - Path Traversal

8 - Unrestricted Upload of Dangerous File Type

5 - Improper Access Control (Authorization)

- 9 OS Command Injection
- 10 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
- 11 Hardcoded Credentials
- 12 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
- 13 PHP File Inclusion
- 14 Improper Validation of Array Index
- 15 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
- 16 Information Exposure Through an Error Message
- 17 Integer Overflow Or Wraparound
- 18 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
- 19 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- 20 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
- 21 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Response
- 22 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- 23 Open Redirect
- 24 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
- 25 Race Conditions

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SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.1.4 ships!

Early Days of the SDL, Part Four Early Days of the SDL, Part Three

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SDL and the CWE/SANS Top 25

Bryan here. The security community has been buzzing since SANS and MITRE's joint announcement earlier this month of their list of the <u>Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors</u>. Now, I don't want to get into a debate in this blog about whether this new list will become the new de facto standard for analyzing security vulnerabilities (or indeed, whether it already has become the new standard). Instead, I'd like to present an overview of how the Microsoft SDL maps

to the	CWE/SANS list, just	CWE	Title	Education?	Manual Process?	Tools?	Threat Model?
May.	17.0	20	Improper Input Validation	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
		116	Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output	Υ	Υ	Υ	
Michae	el and I have writte	89	Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure (aka SQL Injection)	Υ	Υ	Υ	
covera	ge of the Top 25 ar	79	Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure (aka Cross-Site Scripting)	Υ	Υ	Υ	
believe	that the results te	78	Failure to Preserve OS Command Structure (aka OS Command Injection)	Υ		Υ	
25 wer	e developed indepe	319	Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information	Υ			Υ
	em out of the softw	0.00	Cross-site Request Forgery (aka CSRF)	Υ		Υ	
	s white paper and	362	Race Condition	Υ			
		209	Error Message Information Leak	Υ	Υ	Υ	
	ce around every m		Failure to Constrain Memory Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	٧	γ	γ	
made r	many of the same S	642	External Control of Critical State Data	Υ			Υ
for you	to download and u	73	External Control of File Name or Path	Υ	Υ	Υ	
		426	Untrusted Search Path	Υ		Υ	
Below	is a summary of ho	94	Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')	Υ	Υ		
see the	SDL covers every	494	Download of Code Without Integrity Check				Υ
	race conditions and		Improper Resource Shutdown or Release	Υ		Υ	
	tiple SDL requirem	CCE	Improper Initialization	Υ		Υ	
	prevent or detect	682	Incorrect Calculation	Y		Y	
LOUIS LC	prevent or detect	285	Improper Access Control (Authorization)	Υ	Υ		Υ
CWE	Title	327	Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm	Υ	Υ	Υ	
CVVE	Title	259	Hard-Coded Password	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
		732	Insecure Permission Assignment for Critical Resource	Υ	Υ		
20	Improper Input Va	330	Use of Insufficiently Random Values	Υ	Υ	Υ	
116	Improper Encodin	250	Execution with Unnecessary Privileges	Υ	Υ		Υ
	Escaping of Outpu		Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security	Υ			Υ

CWE Outreach: A Team Sport

May/June Issue of IEEE Security & Privacy...

CWE-732: Insecure Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

eral times here, but review al missions and ACLs on all of you create in the file system configuration stores such Windows registry. In the cas Windows Vista and larer change any default ACL in th system or registry unless vo tend to weaken the ACL

Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Identify all the random generators in your code and di mme which, if any, generate passwords, or some other secret Make sure the code generating random numbers is cryptogra cally random and not a deter ictic mendorandom cenerate the C runtime rand() func Using functions like rand (fine, but not for cryptographs

CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary

Identify all processes that mine what privileges they rec runs as root (on Linux, Un Mac OS X) or system (Winds the answer is totally valid bec the code must perform a p leged operation, but some you don't know why it run way other than, "That's the it's always run!" If the code need to operate at high privi keep the time span within w the code is high privilege as ing a port below 1024 in a L

file and path form before a cess a file or strict what co or filename. view, look fo and make su name is approto valid data. and "known i

portant that c

CWE-426

Untrusted Old versions searched the rent director filenames, w problems if t had a weak application with low privilege can fully, weak help contain the damage aren't comm no guarante tion won't u searches or v tion from a mised source covironment remedy is to path, but this

international

tems-for ex

Vista, the cal

doesn't exist

version of V

correct path l

CWE-94:

Failure to

Generatio

lt's common to see code inicc-

tion vulnerabilities in JavaScript

nde that builds a string dynami-

execute. If the attacker controls

the source string in any way, he or

she can create a malicious payload.

The simplest way to eradicate this

kind of bug is to eraclicate the use

of eval(), but that could mean

redesigning the application.

Privileges

part of your solution and de to operate correctly. If a proask yourself, "Why?" Somet as possible—for example, o be run as root, but after that

server applications, receive untrusted requests and use the data in them to interact with the underlying operating system. Unfortunately, this can lead to severe server compromise if the incoming data isn't analyzed-again, the best defense is to check the data. Also, running the potentially vulnerable

Command Structure

(XSS), CW-E-79 is the real bug

that makes CWE-116 worse. In

the past, we took XSS bogs light-

ly, but now we see worms that can

exploit XSS vulnerabilities in so-

cial networks such as MySpace (for

example, the Samy worm). Also,

research into Web-related vulner-

abilities has progressed substan-

tially over the past few years, with

new ways to attack systems regu-

larly uncovered. For pure XSS is-

sues as defined by CWE-79, the

best defense is to validate all in-

coming data. This has always been

the right approach and will prob-

ably continue to be so for the fore-

seeable future. Developers can also

add a layer of defense by encoding

output derived from untrusted in-

put (see CWE-116).

CWE-78: Failure

to Preserve OS

CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Sensitive data must obviously be protected at rest and while on the wire. The best solution to this vulnerability is to use a welltested technology such as SSL/ TLS or IPSec. Don't (ever!) create your own communication method and cryptographic defense. This weakness is related to CWE-327 ("Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"), so make sure you aren't using weak 40-bit RC4 or shared-key IPSec.

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery

Cross-site request forgery (also known as CSRF) vulnerabilities are a relatively new form of Web weakness caused, in part, by a bad Web application design: In short, this design doesn't verify that a request came from valid user code and is instead acting maliciously on the user's behalf. Generally, the best defense is to use a unique and unpredictable key for each user. Traditionally, verifying input doesn't mitigate this bug type because the input is valid.

CWF-362. Race Condition

Race conditions are timing problens that lead to unexpected behavior-for example, an application uses a filename to verify that a file exists and then uses the same filename to open that file. The problem is in the small Many applications, particularly time delay between the check and the file open, which attackers can use to change the file or delete or create it. The sufest way to mitigate file system race conditions is to open the object and then use the resulting handle for further operations. Also, consider reducing the scope of shared objects-for example, temporary files should be local to the user and not shared with multiple user accounts. Correct use of synchronization primitives (mutexes, semaphores, critical sections) is similarly important.

CWE-209: **Error Message** Information Leak

Error information is critical to debugging failed operations, but you must understand who can read that data. In general, you should restrict detailed error messages to crosted users. Remote and monvmous users should see generic messages with the detailed data logged to an audit log.

Failure to Constrain Memory Operati

scource of C and C+ er vulnerability type I more headaches than bu runs. The best way to re problem is to move away and C++ where it ma and use higher-level l such as Ruby, C#, and s cause they don't offer dir to memory, For C and C cations, developers shoul "known bad" functions s C runtime (for example,

streat, strnepy. sprint and sets) and many weak APIs at com and you should strive compiles. Also, fuzz o static analysis can belo tential buffer overrun operating-system-level such as address space la domization and no execu can help reduce the cha buffer overrun is exploital

CWE-642: External Control of Critical State

Unprotected state infi such as profile data or or formation, is subject to it's important to protect by using the appropria control lists (ACLs) or pe for persistent data and se of cryptographic defense a hashed message authcode (HMAC), for ondata. You can use an H

External Control of Filename or P.

Attackers might be able arbitrary file data if the the data that's used as reor path name. It's criti**Basic Training** Editors: Richard Ford, rford@se.fit.edu

Improving Software Security by Eliminating the CWE Top 25 Vulnerabilities

encoding Web-based output is a de-

fense in case the developer doesn't

detect and prevent malicious Web

input (see CWE-79 and CWE-

20). However, the industry has seen

many security bugs that could have

been prevented if the developer had

n January 2009, MITRE and SANS issued the "2009 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors" to help make developers more aware of the bugs that can cause security compromises

(http://cwe.mitre.org/top25). I was one of the many people

Microsoft

from industry, government, and cademia who provided input to the document CWE, which stands for Com-

mon Weakness Enumeration, is a project sponsored by the National Cyber Security Division of the US Denartment of Homeland Security to classify security bues. It assigns a unique number to weakness types uch as buffer overruns or cross-site scripting bugs (for example, CWE-327 is "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"]. Shortly after the Top 25 list's release, Microsoft unveiled a document entitled. "The Microsoft SDL and the CWE/SANS Top 25," to explain how Microsoft's security processes can help prevent the worst offenders (http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/ archive/2009/01/27/sdl-and-the -cwe-sans-top-25.aspx).

Full disclosure: I'm one of that document's coauthors, but my purpose here isn't to regurgitate the Microsoft piece. Rather, my goal is to describe some best practices that can help you eliminate the CWE Top 25 vulnerabilities in your own development environment and products. It's also important to understand that addressing the weak-

software is secure from all forms attack there are plenty more vu nerability types to worry about!

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The vax majority of serious curity vulnerabilities are input validation issues: buffer overrun scripting bugs come immediatel to mind. Developers simply tru the incomine data instead of un derstanding that they must analyz the input for validity. I can't stre this enough if developers simple learned to never trust incomis data fin terms of format, conter and size), many serious bugs wou go away. The core lesson here is fo developers to carefully validate in put and for designers to understan how they can build their systems protect input such that only trus users can manipulate the data.

CWE-116: Encodi

Basic Training

Improving Software Security by Eliminating the CWE Top 25 Vulnerabilities MICHAEL HOWARD

READING OVER YOUR SHOULDER . DEALING WITH THE SMAKE GRID

Improper Outou

You con really isn't

time. Fuzz testing is also effective at detecting CWE-665.

Incorrect Calculation


Many buffer overrups in C and C++ code today are actually related to incorrect buffer- or array-size calculations. If an attacker controls one or more of the elements in a size calculation, he or she can priate permission.

the very least, look for terms like "pwd" and "password" and make sure you have no hard-coded pass words or secret data in the code. You should also store this data in a secure location within the operating system. By secure, I mean protect it with an appropriate perthe encryption key with an appro-

COPUBLISHED BY THE EEE COMPUTER AND RELIABILITY SOCIE








[비즈니스 임팩트를 줄여주는 새로운 품질 관리 방법론]

y5를 사용하여, 소프트웨어 결함을 없애는 5가지 스텝은 아래와 같습니다.




CE スキャンソフトウェア

Coverity5を使用して、ソフトウェア不具合を簡単に除去する 5ステップは以下の通りです。



Korean





IBM Software Technical White Paper

One way to improve software security is to gain a better understanding of the most common weaknesses that can affect software security. With that in mind, there are many resources available online to help organizations learn about

Resources available to help organizations protect systems in

Resource	Focus	Creating a se plan includes		
DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP)	The DIACAP defines the minimum standa accredited by the DoD and authorized to application-level security controls, but it is activities, general tasks, and a managem	⁵ For more inform ⁶ For more inform		
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)	The DISA provides a security technical in development that offer more granular info- bility assessment techniques. The checklis	10 Security in Development:		
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	The DHS offers information on security best part of its "Build Security In" initiative.	st practices and tools for application- and soft		
The Common Weaknesses Enumeration project, a community-based program sponsored by the MITRE Corporation, an IBM Business Partner	enumeration (CWE) knowledge bases about	ne common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVI ut currently known vulnerabilities and types of tware and deals with patches and known vuln bilities.		
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)		web application security issues, the OWASP mmonly found and commonly exploited vulne		
Cigital Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM)	Created by Cigital, an IBM Business Partner, the BSIMM is designed to help organization and plan a software security initiative. The focus is on making applications more secure, process and at later stages in the software life cycle.			
IBM X-Force™ research and development team	A global cyberthreat and risk analysis team that monitors traffic and attacks around the of IBM X-Force team is an excellent resource for trend analysis and answers to questions a attacks are most common, where they are coming from and what organizations can do the risks.			
IBM Institute for Advanced Security (IAS)	This companywide cybersecurity initiative applies IBM research, services, software and thelp governments and other clients improve the security and resiliency of their IT and but			

Test and vulnerability assessment

Testing applications for security defects should be an integral and organic part of any software testing process. During security testing, organizations should test to help ensure that the security requirements have been implemented and the product is free of vulnerabilities.

The SEF refers to the MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration⁵ (CWE) list and the Common


Vulnerability E be tested. Thi information ar and vulnerabil against the m

Security in Development: The IBM Secure Engineering Framework



- Emphasizing security awareness and requirements in the software development process
- Discussing test and vulnerability assessments





Making the Business Case for Software Assurance

Nancy R. Mead Julia H. Allen W. Arthur Conklin Antonio Drommi John Harrison Jeff Ingalsbe James Rainey Dan Shoemaker

April 2009

SPECIAL REPORT CMU/SEI-2009-SR-001

CERT Program

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Carnegie Mellon



OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability Management

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ABSTRACT

In order to reach the goals of the Information Security Automation Program (ISAP) [1], we propose an ontological approach to capturing and utilizing the fundamental concepts in information security and their relationship, retrieving vulnerability data and reasoning about the cause and impact of vulnerabilities. Our outology for vulnerability management (OVM) has been populated with all vulnerabilities in NVD [2] with additional inference rules, knowledge representation, and data-mining mechanisms. With the seamless integration of common vulnerabilities and their related concepts such as attacks and countermeasures, OVM provides a promising pathway to making ISAP successful.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General [Security and protection], K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]. Security and Protection;

General Terms

Ontology, Security, Vulnerability Analysis and Management

Leywords

Security vulnerability, Semantic technology, Ontology, Vulnerability analysis

1. INTRODUCTION

The Information Security Automation Program (ISAP) is a U.S. government multi-agency initiative to enable automation and standardization of technical security operations [1]. Its high-level goals include standards based automation of security checking and remediation as well as automation of technical compliance activities. Its low-level objectives include enabling standards based communication of vulnerability data, customizing and managing configuration baselines for various IT products, assessing information systems and reporting compliance status, using standard metrics to weight and aggregate potential vulnerability impact, and remediating identified vulnerabilities [1]. Secure computer systems ensure that confidentiality, integrity, and availability are maintained for users, data, and other information assets. Over the past a few decades, a significantly large amount of knowledge has been accumulated in the area of information security. However, a lot of concepts in information security are vaguely defined and sometimes they have different

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CSIIRW '09, April 13-15, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA Copyright © 2009 ACM 978-1-60558-518-5 ... \$5.00 semantics in different contexts, causing misunderstanding among stake holders due to the language ambiguity. On the other hand, the standardization, design and development of security tools [1-5] require a systematic elassification and definition of security concepts and techniques. It is important to have a clearly defined vocabulary and standardized language as means to accurately communicate system vulnerability information and their countermeasures among all the people involved. We believe that semantic technology in general, and ontology in particular, could be a useful tool for system security. Our research work has confirmed this belief and this paper will report some of our work in this area.

An ontology is a specification of concepts and their relationship. Ontology represents knowledge in a formal and structured form. Therefore, ontology provides a better tool for communication, reusability, and organization of knowledge. Ontology is a knowledge representation (KR) system based on Description Logics (DLs) [6], which is an umbrella name for a family of KR formalisms representing knowledge in various domains. The DL formalism specifies a knowledge domain as the "world" by first defining the relevant concepts of the domain, and then it uses these concepts to specify properties of objects and individuals occurring in the domain [10-12]. Semantic technologies not only provide a tool for communication, but also a foundation for highlevel reasoning and decision-making. Ontology, in particular, provides the potential of formal logic inference based on welldefined data and knowledge bases. Ontology captures the relationships between collected data and use the explicit knowledge of concepts and relationships to deduce the implicit and inherent knowledge. As a matter of fact, a heavy-weight ontology could be defined as a formal logic system, as it includes facts and rules, concepts, concept taxonomies, relationships, properties, axioms and constraints.

A vulnerability is a security flaw, which arises from computer system design, implementation, maintenance, and operation. Research in the area of vulnerability analysis focuses on discovery of previously unknown vulnerabilities and quantification of the security of systems according to some metrics. Researchers at MITRE have provided a standard format for naming a security vulnerability, called Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [14], which assigns each vulnerability a unique identification number. We have designed a vulnerability ontology OVM (ontology for vulnerability management) populated with all existing vulnerabilities in NVD [2]. It supports research on reasoning about vulnerabilities and characterization of vulnerabilities and their impact on computing systems. Vendors and users can use our ontology in support of vulnerability analysis, tool development and vulnerability management.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the architecture of our OVM. Section 3 discusses how to populate the OVM with vulnerability instances from NVD and other

A Policy-Based Vulnerability Analysis Framework

By

SOPHIE JEAN ENGLE B.S. (University of Nebraska at Omaha) 2002

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Computer Science

in the

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

DAVIS

Approved:

Professor Matt Bishop (Chair)

Professor S. Felix Wu

Professor Karl Levitt

Professor Sean Peisert

Committee in Charge

2010

1



Analysis-Based Verification: A Programmer-Oriented Approach to the Assurance of Mechanical Program Properties

T. J. Halloran May 27, 2010 CMU-ISR-10-112

Institute for Software Research School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Thesis Committee:

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Linkage with Fundamental Changes in Enterprise Security Initiatives

Twenty Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Def Guidelines

What the 20 CSC Critics say...

20 Critical Security Controls - Version 2.0

- 20 Critical Security Controls Introduction (Version 2.0)
- Critical Control 1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
- Critical Control 2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
- Critical Control 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and So
- Critical Control 4: Secure Configurations for Network Devices
- Critical Control 5: Boundary Defense
- Critical Control 6: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of
- Critical Control 7: Application Software Security
- Critical Control 8: Controlled Use of Administrative Privilege
- Critical Control 9: Controlled Access Based on Need to Know
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Procedures and tools for implementing the

Audit Guidelines" Source code testing tools, web application security scanning tools, and object code testing tools have proven useful in securing application software, along with manual application security penetration testing by testers who have extensive programming knowledge as well as application penetration testing expertise. The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) initiative is utilized by many such tools to identify the weaknesses that they find. Organizations can also use CWE to determine which types of weaknesses they are most interested in addressing and removing. A broad community effort to identify the "Top 25 Most Dangerous"

Programming Errors" is also available as a minimum set of important issues to investigate and address during the application development process. When evaluating the effectiveness of testing for these weaknesses, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) can be used to organize and record the breadth of the testing for the CWEs as well as a way for testers to think like attackers in their development of test cases.

CAG: Critical Control 7: Application Software Security

<< previous control

Consensus Audit Guidelines

next control >>

How do attackers exploit the lack of this control?

Attacks against vulnerabilities in web-based and other application software have been a top priority for criminal organizations in recent years. Application software that does not properly check the size of user input, fails to sanitize user input by filtering out unneeded but potentially malicious character sequences, or does not initialize and clear variables properly could be vulnerable to remote compromise. Attackers can inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, and cross-site scripting code to gain control over vulnerable machines. In one attack in 2008, more than 1 million web servers were exploited and turned into infection engines for visitors to those sites using SQL injection. During that attack, trusted websites from state governments and other organizations compromised by attackers were used to infect hundreds of thousands of

CWE and CAPEC included in Control 7 of the "Twenty Critical Controls for **Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus**





Linkage with Fundamental Changes in Enterprise Security Initiatives

exchange data based upon well defined and widely adopted interface standards. Policy Interoperability. Common business processes related to the transmission.

Technical Interoperability. The ability for different technologies to communicate and

receipt, and acceptance of data among participants.

Within cybersecurity, all three types of interoperability are being enabled through an approach that has been refined over the past decade by many in industry, academia, and government. It is an information-oriented approach, generally referred to as [cyber] security content automation and comprises the following elements. 13

Enumerations. These are lists or catalogs of the fundamental entities of cybersecurity, for example, cyber devices and software items (CPE); device and software

messes in architecture, design, or code (CWE) E); or publicly known attack patterns (CAPEC)

Credit card in leverages te enumerations and support the creation of scores for this, assessment results, audit logs, messages, severity level sociated with assets, configurations, DF & OVAL): security announcements (CAIF). ated with vulnerability (CVSS), sensor

> ERT security bulletins and incident reports chnical interoperability.

s, checklists, tools, guidelines, rules, and s, knowledge repositories serve as the enable policy interoperability. Examples noused on the National Checklist Program rtment of Defense Security Technical Audit and e can alsor guides."

> pported security content automation efforts Projections are based on current resourcing rected community. Figure 4 also illustrates functionality over time (e.g., the expansion of

tops to networks).

of the various named standards

Enabling Distributed Security in Cyberspace

Vendors include CVE. CVSS in initial advisories some include OVAL definitions

behind vulnerabilities and address them during development (CWE launched)

Understand the reason

Vulnerability Menagement to Software Assul broad collection of best practices,

Insight: log events are very low in informational content and take too much space!

Identify the events that have security

relevance

Events to Intrusions

Create a central repository of the patterns of attack for everyone to leverage (CAPEC launched)

Malware, in any fo

Attacks

specific goals and methods (MAEC launch

reformed (L

MÆC March 23, 2011

12

CWE and CAPEC included in "Enabling Distributed Security in **Cyberspace: Building a Healthy** and Resilient Cyber Ecosystem with Automated Collective Action"

March 23, 2011

Building a Healthy and Resilient Cyber

Ecosystem with Automated Collective Action

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Technology, Tools & Product Eval.

Acquisition & Outsourcing Measurement

Business Case

Malware

SwA Market Place

SwA Landerane

SwA Ecosystem

Making Security Measurable



security, and reliability in software.

FORUM PRESENTATIONS

SwA Forum presentations that are released for publication are posted h

13th Semi-Annual Software Assurance Forum - September 27-October

12th Semi-Annual Software Assurance Forum - March 9-12, 2010

11th Semi-Annual Software Assurance Forum - November 3-5, 2009

10th Semi-Annual Software Assurance Forum - March 10-12, 2009

9th Semi-Annual Software Assurance Forum - October 14-16, 2008

SWA WORKING GROUPS

In between SwA Forums, the DHS SwA Program hosts SwA Working Gro provide venues for public-private collaboration in advancing software as initiatives, and status updates from the SwA Working Groups are presen Forums and to other relevant stakeholder groups. For more information WG sessions, see the Events page on Build Security In.

. June 21-23, 2010 Working Group Session Agenda and Presentations December 14-16, 2010 Working Group Session Agenda and Presen

Learn more about SwA Forums and Working Group Sessions or download and Working Group Sessions Fact Sheet and Frequently Asked Question





Workforce Education & Training

SwA Forums & Working Groups

Processes & Practices

Technology, Tools & Product Eval.

- Activities
- Resources
- Collaborations
- Research

Acquisition & Outsourcing

Measurement

Business Case

Resources

Build Security In

SwA Tools Overview

CERT Secure Coding Standards

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

The Data & Analysis Center for Software

Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development: Available for download on the National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development site.

Function Extraction: Automated Behavior Computation for Aerospace Software Verification and Certification (PDF)

ISO/IEC SC22 OWGV Guidance for Avoiding Vulnerabilities through Language Selection

and Use

